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Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to analyse the origins of the 
welfare state in Spain using the theoretical framework designed by Peter 
Lindert. With this aim, we offer an econometric analysis of the factors that 
determined the evolution of the Spanish social spending between 1880 and 
1960. By using new quantitative evidence, we constructed a panel-data set 
divided in five years periods with the percentage of social spending 
disaggregated in three groups: health care, social security and welfare. Our 
analysis allows us to put the Spanish case within the international debate on 
the historical determinants of the welfare state. The results obtained highlight 
a number of interesting features specific to this country. On the one hand, 
Spanish social spending as a percentage of GDP remained relatively low 
compared to the figures recorded by other countries during the period under 
study. On the other hand, demographic factors played a determining role in the 
initial stages of the development of welfare state, while economic growth had 
a more ambiguous influence. The political and public finance variables also 
exercised some influence on the growth in public spending. However, 
globalisation was not a motivating force behind the welfare state in Spain.  
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Resumen: El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los 
orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico 
elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico 
de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este 
país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó 
un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al 
PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El 
análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los 
resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país. De un lado, el 
gasto social público en España mantuvo unos porcentajes relativamente bajos 
respecto al PIB en comparación con otros países. De otro, los factores 
demográficos desempeñaron un papel determinante en las etapas iniciales del 
desarrollo del Estado de bienestar, mientras que el crecimiento económico 
ejerció una influencia más ambigua. Las variables políticas y fiscales también 
influyeron en el comportamiento del gasto social. Sin embargo, la 
globalización no ejerció ninguna influencia significativa en el proceso de 
configuración del Estado de Bienestar en España. 
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Introduction  
The evolution of the welfare state was one of the most significant events 
of the twentieth century. Its emergence meant a radical change in the role played 
by the state in the economy while, at the same time, it triggered the creation of 
new mechanisms of social protection in a system that had previously only 
known the traditional measures provided by the Church and family. These first 
legal systems of social security were set up to provide cover against the risks of 
accidents in the workplace, old age, sickness and unemployment. Later, in some 
countries, they were expanded to include the building of social housing for 
working-class families and family benefit schemes to foster demographic 
growth. At the same time, governments expanded their budgetary functions by 
implementing a radical transformation in the level and internal structure of 
public spending and in the sources of state finance. There can be little doubt that 
the formation of the welfare state required a new philosophy in the drafting of 
public budgets and in the application of tax policy.1 In this new context, taxes 
were no longer solely a means for collecting resources, but rather became anti-
cyclical instruments and tools of redistribution. Meanwhile, government 
objectives of balancing budgets and monetary stability gave way to a greater 
concern for social equity and economic growth. 
The origins of the welfare state can be traced back to the early twentieth 
century, when many European countries created and began to subsidise the first 
systems of social security2; and in some of them (primarily the countries of 
northwest Europe) major changes were recorded in their levels of social 
spending before 19303. However, most quantitative studies examining the 
causes and forces that made possible the advent of the welfare state have centred 
on the period following World War II, in all likelihood because it was during 
                                                 
1 Comín (1996), p. 160. 
2 See Flora (1983). 
3 See Lindert (1994). 
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these years that the welfare state experienced its most rapid expansion. 
However, Peter Lindert (1994, 2004), drawing on information from the 
International Labour Office, undertook one of the most exhaustive international 
quantitative studies of the determinants of social spending between 1880 and 
1930. In general, Lindert found that the spread of suffrage, Protestantism and the 
ageing of the population had a positive effect for the growth in social spending, 
while the increase in per capita income and the percentage of the working 
population engaged in agriculture had a much less decisive impact. 
In the case of Spain, the origins of modern social policy remain largely 
unexplored, at least in quantitative terms. And in fact, the studies that have been 
carried out on this period are, on the whole, descriptive in nature, tending to 
focus on the historical evolution in social legislation. Thus, this study seeks to 
fill this void by analysing the origins of the welfare state in Spain using the 
theoretical framework designed by Lindert (1994, 2004). The rest of this paper, 
therefore, undertakes an econometric analysis of the factors that determined the 
evolution in social spending in Spain between 1880 and 1960. 
The analysis proposed here allows us to overcome certain traditional 
limitations of Spanish historiography in this field. On the one hand, the use of a 
historical series of social spending data with a greater degree of disaggregation 
enables us to analyse the individual behaviour of each group of social costs in a 
more detailed fashion. On the other, the length of the study period breaks with 
the traditional barrier of separation that the country’s Civil War has represented 
for many previous studies.4 Finally, we should stress that our analysis allows us 
to add the Spanish case to the on-going debate within the international literature 
regarding the determinants of the welfare state, but on this occasion using data 
drawn from national sources that are richer and more abundant than the 
                                                 
4 Most studies of the welfare state in the Spanish historiography have focused on the pre-Civil 
War, e.g. the trilogy written by Montero (1988), Cuesta (1988) and Samaniego (1988), or the 
post-war period, e.g., Molinero & Ysàs (1985), Giner (1994), Gadea (1996), Rodríguez 
Cabrero (2004) and Vilar (2006). Exceptions exist, including Comín (1996). 
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information available in the international statistical yearbooks used by Lindert in 
his influential analysis. 
 
1. Theoretical framework 
 
Historically, the data indicate that in the most advanced economies social 
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product grew throughout the 
nineteenth century, accelerated between 1880 and World War II and reached its 
period of maximum splendour in the decades following this conflict (Table 1).5 
This rapid advance was stemmed after 1980 and its relative participation in the 
domestic product has increased very little since. These long-term trends came to 
be shared, sooner of later, by the countries of the OECD, which constitute the 
subjects of most empirical studies.6 However, while a common pattern can be 
discerned, it is also true that the social policies applied in each country did not 
result in the development of identical systems of social cover. Taking this as its 
starting point, economic theory has tried to identify the common forces that gave 
rise to the welfare state and caused it to expand in the most advanced countries 
and to determine the factors that caused different structures of welfare to 
originate in economies of a similar level of development.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Social transfers as a percentage of GDP in Europe (1880-1980) 
                                                 
5 In line with Lindert (2004), I, p. 11. 
6 A large body of case studies and international comparisons of the trajectories taken by social 
policies in the long term exists. See for example Rimlinger (1971), Heclo (1974), Flora & 
Heidenheimer (1981), Castles (1985), Esping-Andersen (1985) and Pierson (1994). An 
interesting critical analysis of these studies is found in Amenta (1993) and (2002). 
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 1880 1930 1980 
Germany 0.50 4.96 23.0 
Austria 0 1.43 23.2 
Belgium 0.17 0.56 25.4 
Denmark 0.96 3.4 29.1 
Finland 0.66 2.97 18.5 
France 0.46 1.08 21.1 
Greece 0 0.07 11.5 
Italy 0 0.1 18.6 
Holland 0.29 1.15 26.9 
Norway 1.07 2.39 18.5 
Portugal 0 0 12.7 
Spain 0 0.074 15.9 
Sweden 0.72 2.6 28.8 
United 
Kingdom  
0.86 2.69 17.9 
European 
Mean 
0.41 1.68 20.80 
 
Source: Lindert (1994) and (1996).  
Including: a) for 1880 and 1930: welfare expenditure, pensions, health care and housing; b) 
for 1980: spending on pensions, health care, welfare, unemployment benefit, housing and 
expenditure on active labour policies. 
 
The economic literature on the determinants of social policy is very 
extensive, so much so that it is not possible to review it in detail here. Thus, 
without any intention of being exhaustive, we find that contemporary studies of 
the modern welfare state start in the decades following World War II, a period 
marked by the golden age of capitalism accompanied by a rise in social 
spending.7 The earliest empirical studies concluded that economic and 
demographic factors were at the root of the welfare state (Wilensky, 1975). On 
the one hand, advancing industrialization generated new demands for public 
spending as the networks of social support typical of agrarian societies, centred 
around the family and tradition, were weakened. In this context, the state 
acquired new functions that involved providing greater protection for a 
                                                 
7 In line with Myles & Quadagno (2002), p. 36 and ff. 
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population that was becoming increasingly wage dependent, and whose general 
welfare needed to be upheld so as to guarantee an available workforce and in 
order to maintain a consensus within a complex urban society (Kerr et al., 1960). 
On the other hand, these processes of economic growth were accompanied by 
demographic changes resulting from increased life expectancy and the ageing of 
the population.8 From this perspective, countries with similar levels of 
development converged towards what were also similar levels of welfare 
(Rimlinger, 1971). But economic and demographic factors could not be used to 
explain the existence of different structures of welfare in these economies. 
This limitation led to the search for other determinants of social spending. 
Authors such as Korpi (1989), Palme (1990) and Kangas (1991) concluded 
empirically that the main differences in the welfare models of the capitalist 
democracies lay in two arms of political pressure wielded by the popular classes 
in order to ensure greater participation in social benefits: electoral processes and 
the strength of the trade unions.9 On the one hand, the shift from census 
suffrage, typical of elitist democracies at the end of the nineteenth century, to 
universal suffrage made it possible for a percentage of the low income 
population, which favoured social transfers, to have an influence on political 
decisions.10 Later, capturing the working-class vote meant that leftwing parties 
                                                 
8 Demographic ageing has become a key variable and one that is significantly positive for the 
historical analyses of welfare (Pampel & Wiliamson, 1989, Hicks & Mishra, 1993 and 
Mulligan et al., 2002). Lindert (2004, I, p. 183 and ff.) points out that the “age effect” in the 
period leading up to World War II can serve as a proxy for other variables that had a positive 
effect on social transfers such as the change in life ratios (life expectancy and fertility) and the 
migratory flows that they caused. On the other hand, the progressive ageing of the population 
in the developed countries at the end of the twentieth century has favoured social transfers, 
although this effect can be annulled if the growing weight of the retired population threatens 
the financial sustainability of the system. 
9 We should not forget though that democracies also offer means for the better off to put a 
stop to social policies through the use of lobbying and making donations to electoral 
campaigns, see Swenson (1996), Barro (1997) and Dixit & Londregran (1998). 
10 For Lindert (2004, I, p. 22) the predominance of electoral elites, where only a small part of 
the population with a certain economic status enjoyed the right to vote, is a key factor in 
explaining the small percentage of social spending of most countries before the 1880s. 
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showed a greater awareness of social questions.11 In general, governments most 
dependent on the result at the ballot box, because of the nature of the electoral 
system or because of the high degree of government rotation, have shown 
themselves more likely to meet the demands of their electorate in order to retain 
power.12 On the other hand, the organization of workers into unions gave them a 
greater capacity to demand that their social rights be upheld, above all by taking 
strike action. However, the effectiveness of these factors for promoting welfare 
policies depended on the degree of mobilization of the working classes in each 
country around unions and in political parties.13 There can be little doubt that 
one thing is to enjoy the right to vote and to join a union and another to exercise 
that right.  
The widening of suffrage for women has also received the interest of 
various authors. However, there is no general consensus as to the effect that this 
might have had on the evolution in social spending. For Lott & Kenny (1999) 
the female vote could have served to promote social transfers and the 
introduction of progressive taxation. However, Lindert (2004, I, p. 182) notes 
that the links are very unclear for a number of reasons. It is hard to imagine that 
women’s voting preferences were so different from those of the men that they 
could condition social policies. Indeed, voting statistics do not show a clear 
pattern regarding women’s voting preferences in a range of countries. Moreover, 
                                                 
11 Hicks & Swank (1992), Cusack (1997) and Snyder & Yackovlev (2000). However, Roemer 
(1998) points out that, if the voters differ both in income and ideology, the parties on the left 
can propose a limited redistribution to attract the richest voters nearest to their political ideas. 
12 Lindert (2004, II, p. 64). Lindert (2004, I, p. 183) adds that the positive effect of the 
rotation of governments can be conditioned in those countries in which the government needs 
to buy votes through extra transfers to appease the masses, widen social support and maintain 
power (the “bread and gladiators” effect). 
13 Huber et al. (1993) and Hicks (1999), but also Shalev (1983) and Esping-Andersen & van 
Kersbergen (1992). Van Leeuwen (1997, p. 765) highlights two factors favouring the long 
term unionisation of workers: an erosion of their position in the labour market, visible through 
the fall in real wages or unemployment, and the transfer of the workforce from agriculture 
into other sectors. 
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women won the right to vote in a context of greater social demands in which 
many economies had already begun to operate their social transfer programmes.  
Some authors argue that the social cohesion of each country, dependent to 
a large extent on the preferences of the average voter, is crucial in explaining 
social spending policies.14 From this perspective, the degree of affinity of the 
average voter with the highest income group or with the poorest sector is 
determined by two types of effect. On the one hand, the degree of ethnic 
homogeneity of the average voter with the recipients of transfers would favour 
their support for levying taxes on the highest incomes and for increasing 
egalitarian spending.15 On the other hand, the possibility of increasing their 
future income and climbing the social ladder would lead the average-income 
voter to identify with the interests of the richest sector of the population, which 
would halt policies of public spending.16 The opposite would occur in a society 
in which there was greater ethnic diversity or the internal mobility between 
income groups was more rigid. These effects were described by Lindert (2004, I, 
p. 186 and ff) with the apt expression that could be me.  
Other authors believe the main determinant of social spending to be the 
size of the population or of the country rather than its ethnic or linguistic 
fragmentation.17 Seen from this perspective, the smallest European states were 
more likely to offer social protection, due to their political stability and the 
greater openness and vulnerability of their economies. But authors such as 
Skocpol (1992) and Steinmo (1993) play down the “size of country” effect and 
emphasise instead their administrative organisation and internal institutional 
structure. In their opinion, autonomy and political decentralization in favour of 
                                                 
14 Alesina et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2001). Easterly & Levine (1997) find empirically a 
strong negative correlation in various countries between ethnic diversity, measured by 
language, and indicators of public goods. On this subject, see also Lindert (2004, I, p. 187). 
15 Metzler & Richard (1981). This thesis has not always been empirically demonstrated, see 
Borck (2007). 
16 Kristov et al. (1992), Piketty (1995a and 1995b) and Benabou & Ok (2001). 
17 Katzenstein (1985) and Gourevitch (1986). 
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regional governments puts a brake on the bureaucratic and financial capacity of 
the central state when implementing social measures. The opposite would occur 
in states with centralised political institutions.18 
In current economic theory too an intense debate has been generated on 
the impact that globalisation might have on social spending policies.  Huberman 
& Lewchuk (2003) find a positive relation between social policies, measured by 
their Labour Compact Index,19 and an economy’s level of trade openness during 
the first stage of globalisation (1850-1913). According to their reports, some 
governments, under growing pressure from their workers, offered packets of 
labour market regulations and social insurance programmes so as to defend 
workers against the risks they faced both in and outside the factory. According 
to their analysis, in countries of greatest openness to the exterior, more direct 
forms of protection were introduced including social insurance, while in 
economies with a lower level of openness other forms of indirect protection, 
such as labour legislation, were predominant.  
The positive effect of opening up to the exterior on policies of 
redistribution during the last decades of the twentieth century has also been 
noted by various authors. In particular, Rodrik (1997 and 1998) and Agell (1999 
and 2002) point out that during this period exposure to international trade 
resulted in greater wage and employment instability, which forced governments 
to widen their protective policies. But while Rodrik emphasises the relationship 
between demand and social protection and exposure to international trade, Agell 
stresses the role played by labour market institutions when restricting wage 
                                                 
18 In this vein, Rogowski (1987), Mansfield & Busch (1995) and Persson & Tabellini (2004) 
point out that the electoral system in each country also influences social spending policies as 
it conditions the degree of sectoral and/or regional pressure to which the representatives 
elected at the ballot boxes are subjected. 
19 The Labour Compact Index comprises a set of regulatory measures of the labour market 
(minimum age for entering the labour market, whether factory inspection was in place, 
whether women were excluded from night work, etc.) and social insurance entitlements 
(accident, retirement pensions, sickness and unemployment) operative in the 17 European 
countries analysed between 1850-1913. 
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structures at the same time as providing the workers with greater social 
insurance.20 In particular, according to Agell (2002), in the absence of perfect 
capital markets, the worker is prepared to negotiate a lower than expected wage 
for a wage structure that offers job security as opposed to uncertainty. From both 
analytical approaches we can conclude implicitly that there exists a certain 
degree of complementarity between market functions and government actions.  
Other factors such as the predominant religion in the country have been 
considered in explaining the different models of welfare employed by countries 
before World War II. During this period, Lindert (2004, II, p. 38) points out that 
Protestant countries such as Great Britain and Scandinavia became the main 
instigators of social transfers, while the Catholic countries lagged behind, with 
the exception of Ireland. It appears that Catholic countries preferred the smaller 
ecclesiastic aid to that of the state, although the impact of the former was very 
limited. The negative influence of Catholicism evaporated after the second post-
war period, when governments of pro-Catholic parties increased social spending 
in various European countries, an attitude conditioned in all certainty by the 
political competition of the socialist parties.21 We should also not forget the 
negative impact of defence budget growth at certain moments in history, since 
this was often financed by cutting social spending.22 
 
 
 
 
2. Trends in the historical evolution of social spending in Spain, 1880-1960. 
                                                 
20 Rodrik (1997, cap. 4) points out that openness had two opposite effects on social spending 
at the end of the twentieth century. On the one hand, exposure to international trade and 
foreign investment led to cut backs in social programmes in those countries so that they could 
maintain their competitiveness abroad. On the other, the greater vulnerability to external 
shocks led to greater demands for security from the population.  
21 Wilensky (1981) and Hicks & Swank (1992). 
22 Lindert (2006, II), p. 72. See also Wilensky (1975) and Pampel & Williamson (1989), 
among others. 
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Before analysing the factors determining the evolution in Spain’s social 
spending between 1880 and 1960, it is interesting to see the main stages in its 
long-term behaviour. To do this, in this section we undertake a temporal analysis 
and show the main trends in its evolution in the period studied here. The 
quantitative data are drawn from the recent estimates of social spending made by 
Espuelas (2008) for the period 1850-1963. This series includes the general 
evolution in social spending, as well as a high degree of disaggregation that 
allows us to analyse individually the behaviour of each type of expenditure23.  
The sources used by Espuelas (2008) for preparing the new series are 
basically the General Accounts, the General State Budgets and information 
drawn from reports, statistics, bulletins and other publications of the institute of 
social security, the Instituto Nacional de Previsión (INP). The new series 
matches the definitions of social spending used by the OECD. This means that 
public expenditure assigned to ensure protection against natural disasters, such 
as earthquakes, floods or agricultural plagues, is excluded from the series. 
Neither do we include social benefits paid to civil servants, because in line with 
OECD definitions these can be considered private systems of (social) security 
(between the state and its employees) and not as public social spending. 
Likewise, compulsory systems of social security financed by the quotas paid by 
employers and workers are not considered as public expenditure, except in those 
cases where state subsidies are received. For this reason, the series that we use 
                                                 
23 Specifically Espuelas (2008) classifies social spending in ten sections: welfare 
(beneficencia), health care, accidents in the workplace, old-age, sickness, maternity, 
unemployment, family, active employment policies and other social programmes. The section 
of “beneficencia” includes subsidies to charitable institutions, while health care includes 
subsidies to hospitals and other health institutions. The sections of accidents in the workplace, 
old-age, sickness, maternity, and unemployment include state grants to the respective social 
security programmes. The section of family includes the subsidies granted to the compulsory 
family allowance system in place during Franco’s regime, and the grants made to large 
families during the 1920s. Finally, the section of active employment policies includes 
basically grants for creating job offices and subsidies for financing public works aimed at 
reducing unemployment. 
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here include only state subsidies to these social security systems, but not the 
contributions paid by employers and workers. Finally, spending on education 
has been excluded from the analysis, because while it can be considered a social 
expense, it is not one of social protection, and in the literature it is usually 
analysed independently from the other social expenses as its determinants are 
considered to be different24. 
Based on the information offered by the series considered in this study, it 
is possible to divide the historical evolution in Spain’s social spending in three 
distinct periods. The first includes the years between 1880 and 1908/09, 
characterised by the marked predominance of liberal principles and very little 
state interference. The second extends until the Civil War (1936-1939) and 
coincides with the period of hegemony that Comín has called the Estado 
Providencia (the Providential State), during which the state began to assume 
new forms of social protection, above all by introducing social security 
payments, albeit with limited effects on the budget. Finally, the third period 
covers the years from 1939 to 1960, corresponding largely with the first stage of 
the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975), prior to the introduction of the Stabilisation 
Plan (1959) which opened the doors to the development of the Spanish economy 
and prompted its return to international markets. 
As mentioned above, the functions of social protection undertaken by the 
state during the period 1880 to 1909 were highly limited. They were almost 
exclusively limited to the areas of welfare and health care, and had as their 
objective the maintenance of public order and the avoidance of the spread of 
epidemics. Such measures were not considered as the right of the beneficiaries, 
but rather as a defence mechanism for privileged groups who saw in the poor 
and the sick potential rioters and propagators of disease.25 Only in 1905 and 
1906 did the state dedicate resources for anything other than health and welfare. 
                                                 
24 On this subject see Lindert (2004). 
25 Comín (1996). On the political function of health care and welfare, see also Muñoz 
Machado (1995) and Maza Zorrilla (1987, 1999). 
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In those years it invested a sizeable quantity of resources in promoting public 
works to combat unemployment, as a response to a grave crisis in agriculture in 
those years. However, these exceptional measures cannot be interpreted as a 
sign of modernization. In fact, this was a policy with a marked traditional 
character, which the city halls often used to maintain public order in times of 
high seasonal unemployment. Graph 1 also shows how spending levels did not 
undergo any significant changes between 1880 and 1908. Expenditure on both 
health care and welfare stayed at low levels, around 0.01 and 0.02 per cent of 
GDP, and with a tendency to stagnate with just slight fluctuations (Graph 1). It 
was, as such, a period in which no mechanisms of social protection were 
introduced above and beyond those that typified liberal welfare and where 
spending levels remained stagnant. 
 
Graph 1. State social spending as a % of GDP, 1880-1908. 
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Source: Espuelas (2008) 
 
However, despite this apparent lack of mobility, it was during these years 
in Spain that the first debates were heard on what was referred to as “social 
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reform”, while the first measures of social legislation began to be introduced. 
Among the most important of these measures were the creation in 1883 of the 
Comisión de Reformas Sociales (CRS), whose main duty was to study the 
situation of the working classes and to draft legislative proposals to improve 
their social conditions; and the introduction of the Law of Associations (1887) 
that recognised the freedom of association, and paved the way for the 
legalisation of workers’ associations. Thus, in 1888 the Unión General de 
Trabajadores (UGT) was founded. Shortly afterwards universal male suffrage 
was introduced (1890), which at least formally gave a political voice to the 
workers and low income groups, and at the same time ought to have permitted a 
shift in the political scales in favour of more redistributive policies. Finally, in 
1903, the Instituto de Reformas Sociales (IRS), the successor to the CRS, was 
founded. This Institute was to become the true motor for the development of 
working class legislation in Spain. However, as discussed above, none of these 
measures had a significant impact on the evolution in public spending. For this 
to occur, it was necessary to wait until the foundation of the Instituto Nacional 
de Previsión (INP) in 1908 and above all for the political changes following 
World War I. 
With the founding of the INP and the introduction of the first (voluntary) 
old-age insurance scheme, the state began to assume new forms of social 
protection. From this point on, welfare and health care were no longer the only 
elements that made up social spending, and at the same time a slow process of 
diversification was initiated. However, the impact on the growth in spending 
during this period was very small because the subsidies granted to the old-age 
insurance scheme, or workers’ retirement pensions, as they were known at that 
time, were kept relatively low. 
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Graph 2. State social spending as a % of GDP, 1909-1935. 
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         Source: Espuelas (2008) 
 
As Graph 2 shows, the real catalyst for social spending occurred after 
World War I. During these years new social programmes were introduced. Thus, 
the old-age insurance scheme, which until this time had operated as a voluntary 
contribution, became compulsory in 1919, and in 1923 maternity benefit was 
created. At the same time, subsidies were granted to the workers’ mutual 
insurance societies and unions to cover social risks such as unemployment and 
sickness, and subsides were agreed to create job placement offices and 
employment offices26. During this period major political and social debates 
centred on the creation of unemployment and sickness insurance schemes, 
although they were not introduced until 1931 and 1942 respectively. Finally, the 
peak recorded in social spending in 1919 (Graph 2) corresponds to a budgetary 
item of more than 40 million pesetas to subsidise public works against 
                                                 
26 Espuelas (2008). 
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unemployment, which Rodríguez Labandeira (1991) has linked with the 1917 
agrarian crisis. 
During the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930),  a period marked by 
a reduction in worker and union rights, no new social insurance schemes were 
introduced. Moreover, during these years, some projects such as unemployment 
insurance were paralysed. However, social spending continued to grow, because 
the state continued to subsidise previously established insurance programmes, 
such as workers’ retirement pensions and maternity benefit, while large families 
were also granted an allowance. 
During the Second Republic (1931-1936) social spending continued to 
grow. New social programmes were introduced such as the voluntary 
unemployment insurance scheme, while maternity benefit was replaced by 
compulsory maternity insurance27. Health care spending also underwent 
considerable growth, while welfare spending suffered a significant fall between 
1931 and 1935. However, the policy that had the greatest impact on the 
evolution in social spending during the republican period was the subsidising of 
public works to combat unemployment. These were responsible for a large 
proportion of the overall growth in social spending. Between 1931 and 1935 
social spending not including public works fluctuated between 0.12 and 0.18% 
of GDP. However, when public works were included the level rose to 0.33-
0.54% of GDP, which means that public works aimed at countering 
unemployment represented more than 50% of social spending during the 
republican period. This predominance can be explained in part by the great 
political importance acquired by unemployment in the agricultural sector during 
these years. But, at the same time, it highlights the low degree of modernization 
attained by social policy in Spain, and the importance in particular periods of 
traditional policies such as the promotion of public works. 
                                                 
27 Maternity insurance was formally approved in 1929 (Royal Decree 22 March, 1929, and 
Regulation 29 January 1930), but did not come into operation until 1931. 
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After the Civil War, the growth trend initiated after World War I was 
broken. Beginning from very low levels in 1940, social spending increased until 
pre-War levels were once again recovered in 1946. However, after this year a 
continuous fall occurred in social spending as a percentage of GDP and this 
went virtually uninterrupted until 1960 (Graph 3). Within the new legislative 
framework of the post-Civil War years, the main insurance schemes were 
Obligatory Old Age and Invalidity Insurance (SOVI) which replaced the former 
workers’ retirement pensions; Obligatory Sickness Insurance (SOE) created in 
1942 and which after 1948 also included maternity benefit (Decree 9 July, 
1948); Obligatory Accident Insurance, which retained the basic characteristics 
of the pre-War period; and, finally, the Obligatory Sickness Insurance 
Programme for Professionals which was introduced in 1950.  
Similarly, along with these social insurance schemes, the dictatorship 
introduced a system of family benefits (1939) around which they created a 
further series of supplementary benefits including national and provincial 
natality prizes, marriage loans, widow and orphan benefits and allowances for 
large families. However, this proliferation of social security schemes did not 
mean greater social expenditure in relative terms. On the contrary, the social 
security system was financed in practice by contributions from employers and 
workers, and state subsidies were scarce and not up-dated on any regular basis, 
despite the high rate of inflation. Therefore, the self-financing principle that 
upheld a large part of Franco’s state security system enables us to explain the 
fall in relative terms of social spending although many new social programmes 
were being introduced28.  
 
                                                 
28 On the characteristics and consequences of the social security system under Franco, see 
Vilar (2006) and the references therein.  
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Graph 3. State social spending as a % of GDP, 1940-1960.       
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          Source: Espuelas (2008) 
 
State social spending not directly related to these social security schemes, 
such as welfare expenditure and spending on health care other than sickness 
insurance (building of hospitals, maintenance costs of health installations, etc.), 
followed a similar trend to that of overall spending, to the extent that it tended to 
fall in relative terms after 1945-46. However, this fall was much less intense in 
health expenditure than it was in the case of welfare spending and social security 
expenditure. Furthermore, the drop in overall social spending that occurred in 
Spain after World War II took place in a context in which most European 
governments were initiating a process of rapid growth in their social 
expenditure. The uniqueness of the Spanish case, therefore, expressed itself in a 
process of divergence that only began to be corrected after 1960-6129.  
 
3. Factors conditioning the evolution in social spending in Spain 
(1880-1960) 
 
                                                 
29 Espuelas (2008). 
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Having described the evolution and internal structure of social spending in 
Spain, this section analyses the factors that determined its long-term behaviour. 
To do this, we constructed a panel data set constituting state spending in social 
security, welfare and health care as a percentage of GDP for 17 cut-off points 
for five-year periods between 1880 and 1960 (Graph 4). Social security 
spending included state subsidies to the various social insurance programmes, 
which depending on the particular period were: accidents, old-age, maternity, 
sickness, and family allowance. This section also includes subsidies for 
unemployment insurance and the creation of job placement offices. However, 
subsidies promoting public works have not been included in this analysis. As we 
discussed in Section 2, this is an item of exceptional expenditure (appearing 
only in certain years) conditioned by a set of factors that differ markedly from 
those of other social spending schemes. Welfare spending includes, as its name 
indicates, state expenditure in the provision of welfare services, while health 
spending includes state expenditure in the provision of healthcare goods other 
than sickness insurance programmes. 
 
Graph 4. Endogenous variables in the panel data set 
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Source: See Appendix. 
Note: WelfGDP = public spending on welfare as a percentage of GDP; HealthGDP = 
public spending on health care as a percentage of GDP; SSGDP = public spending on 
social security as a percentage of GDP. 
 
In line with the theoretical framework outlined earlier, the historical 
advance in social spending in the most advanced countries was determined by 
economic, demographic, and socio-political variables as well as by the impact of 
globalisation.30 Within the first group, we considered the level of GDP per 
capita in each cut-off period in natural logarithms (Log GDP), representative of 
the level of income in the Spanish economy, and the mean annual growth ratio 
of GDP per capita in the last five years (Growth GDP), which enables us to 
capture the impact of economic cycles on the percentage of social spending. In 
line with the vast literature on economic development and the welfare state, we 
expected a priori that the long-term increase in per capita income levels would 
allow public spending to increase as the fiscal capacity of the state also grew. 
Moreover, the effect of economic cycles is not so clear, since the demand for 
social protection from the population tends to increase more in periods in which 
rates of growth are lowest, while in the growth phases of the cycle the opposite 
occurs.31 However, we should not forget that the state enjoys a greater financial 
capacity to expand social policies through public spending as rates of economic 
growth rise. 
In the case of demographic changes, we expected the progressive ageing 
of the population - due to the increase in life expectancy and the reduction in the 
fertility which seems to typify developing economies, to favour social transfers 
in two ways. On the one hand, demographic ageing leads to a greater demand 
for social spending, above all in social security and health care. On the other 
hand, the existence of a broad percentage of elderly population usually generates 
                                                 
30 Recall that we are adopting a Lindert-style framework (2004). 
31 Lindert (1994), p.26. 
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less resistance in society to policies of social transfers, even though there are 
limits on the generosity of the taxpayers32. To capture the effect that the ageing 
of the adult population had on social spending we introduced two variables in 
our estimation: the ratio between the population over the age of 65 and the 
population older than 20 (Adults 65), and the ratio between the population 
between the ages of 20 and 34 and the population over 20 (Young Adults). Here, 
we expected the increase in the ageing rate to favour spending for social 
purposes (ceteris paribus), and that the opposite would occur as the weight of 
the young adult population increased. It is worth highlighting that the “age 
effect” can also act as a proxy for other variables such as an improvement in 
living conditions. 
In the case of the political variables, we introduced two types of effect 
into the model: the degree of democracy (Demo) and the percentage of voters 
with respect to the electoral roll (Voter turnout).33 To capture this first effect we 
bore in mind that during the period of study a transition occurred in Spain from 
census suffrage to universal suffrage, which could have had an influence on 
social spending behaviour. Consequently, we constructed two dummy variables, 
one (Demo-r) which takes a value of 1 in periods in which male census suffrage 
was in operation (1880-1890) and a value of 0 for the other periods; and a 
second variable (Demo-u) which takes a value of 1 in the periods in which 
universal male suffrage (1891-1923 and 1931-1932) and universal suffrage were 
in operation (1933-1936) and a value of 0 for the other periods. In line with the 
theoretical framework, we expected that the stages with greatest guarantees of 
democracy, in which the right to vote extended to include the lowest income 
                                                 
32 Lindert (2004, II), p. 65 and ff. 
33 As an alternative we also used the variable VOTP25, defined as the percentage of the 
population that exercised its right to vote with respect to the total population over the age of 
25, the minimum voting age in that period, except during the Second Republic when the limit 
was lowered to 23. However, the results were similar. Further, we also considered the impact 
of the female vote but this was found not to be significant, which is logical if we consider that 
the variable only takes a value other than zero in 1935. 
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groups, would favour (ceteris paribus) an increase in social spending, due to the 
need to capture the votes of the popular classes and the latter’s increased 
capacity to bring pressure to bear. This said, however, the net impact of 
democracy on the percentage of social spending depended to a large extent on 
the percentage of adults with the right to vote that actually exercised that right. 
For this reason, we also introduced into our estimation the percentage of voters 
with respect to the electoral roll (Voter turnout). We expected this variable 
(ceteris paribus) to have a positive effect on social spending.  
The availability of financial resources for use by the state also conditioned 
social spending behaviour from a historical point of view. This factor acquired 
particular importance in the case of Spain, since one of the main endemic evils 
in the history of the Spanish treasury lay in the late modernisation of the tax 
system, characterised by the primacy of indirect taxation and the low ratio of tax 
income with respect to GDP. The maintenance of a socially unjust tax system 
based on the primacy of indirect taxation and a relatively low tax pressure led to 
an insufficient public tax collection to meet the growing needs of the state. 
Consequently, the resources available for social uses were very scarce, 
regardless of the wishes of the government in office.34 To capture the effect of 
the scarcity of resources available to the Spanish treasury on social spending 
behaviour we introduced the percentage of public revenues with respect to GDP 
as an explanatory variable. We expected this variable to have a positive effect on 
social spending behaviour (ceteris paribus). 
                                                 
34 Comín (1996, p. 121) points out that “el objetivo de la redistribución de la renta mediante 
los tributos ha sido inalcanzable en España hasta 1979. El predominio de la imposición 
indirecta y la regresividad práctica de los impuestos de producto, tanto por los 
procedimientos de recaudación como por el extendido fraude, conducían a que los tributos 
redistribuyeran la renta, pero a favor de los más ricos hasta tiempos recientes” [“The 
objective of income redistribution through the tax system has been unachievable in Spain 
until 1979. The pre-eminence of indirect tax and the actual regressivity of product taxes, 
because of both the collection mechanisms and the extension of tax fraud, led taxes to 
redistribute income, but in favour of the richest people until recent times”]. 
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Another of the budgetary items that conditioned the cyclical availability 
of resources for social purposes was public spending for military purposes, a 
factor closely related to the political framework and the state’s war 
commitments, both abroad (most notably in this period the colonial wars of 
Cuba and Morocco) and at home, above all, during the Civil War (1936-1939) 
and the post-war period, in which there was an enormous relative increase in 
defence spending. The militaristic vocation of the early decades of the Franco 
dictatorship could have generated a trade-off between “guns and butter” 
(Lindert, II, 2006, p. 72). To capture this possible effect we introduced the 
percentage of public spending on defence with respect to GDP (Military 
expenditures) into the estimation.35 We expected a negative relationship between 
the evolution in social spending and the cycles of greatest military spending 
(ceteris paribus).  
Finally, in line with the theoretical framework, we introduced the impact 
of the opening up of the Spanish economy to international commerce 
(Globalisation) on the evolution in social spending. In this case, the expected 
sign of the relationship between trade openness and social transfers was not 
clear. On the one hand, we expected governments to show greater sensitivity 
towards measures of social protection in periods of greatest economic openness, 
in order to counter the greater vulnerability to shocks from external trade. On the 
other hand, greater international openness might also lead to governments 
introducing cut backs in their social programmes in order to make their economy 
internationally competitive.36  
                                                 
35 We also considered the percentage of defence spending with respect to total spending but 
the result was similar. 
36 Here, the results reported by Rodrik (1997) suggest that openness in itself has a negative 
effect on social spending but that this effect is significantly positive when it interacts with the 
real exchange relation. Lindert (2004, II, p. 72) considers openness exclusively in his 
estimation, obtaining a significant positive result. Here we opted to follow Lindert’s model 
and so we introduced exclusively the openness variable to capture the effect of exposing the 
economy to foreign forces on social spending. 
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Other forces that might have conditioned the evolution in welfare 
spending with respect to GDP, such as the rate of worker unionisation or the 
number of strikes, were not included in the model owing to a lack of historical 
data for Spain during the period of study.37 However, given Spain’s political 
trajectory during this period, it is likely that the Demo variable captures part of 
these effects, since the possibility of demonstrating and calling for workers’ 
social rights were not viable in the periods of dictatorship which account for 
more than 40% of the study period. The final results of the econometric analysis 
are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Factors that explain the evolution in social spending as a 
percentage of Spain’s GDP (1880-1960) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.005580 
(1.101265)
0.005599 
(1.302248)
0.005580 
(1.071892) 
0.005599 
(1.269275)
Trend -3.98E-08* 
(-2.983348)
-3.86E-08*
(-5.294030)
-3.98E-08*  
(-2.903778) 
-3.86E-08* 
(-5.159982)
Log GDP -0.000266 
(-1.292095) 
-0.000330**
 (-1.944189)
 
Growth GDP 0.004369* 
(4.281487)
0.004789* 
(5.300691)
0.004369* 
(4.167294) 
0.004789* 
(5.166475)
Young Adults -0.034005* -0.035158* -0.034005* -0.035158* 
                                                 
37 Unlike Lindert’s estimation (2004), we did not include the effects of religion and ethnic 
heterogeneity for two reasons: this is a case study and not an international comparative 
analysis and, historically, Spain has been a country of net emigration and one with a strong 
Catholic tradition, so that the two variables make little sense in the estimation. 
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(-3.064057)  (-4.438664)  (-2.982334) (-4.326274)
Adults 65 0.025900* 
(2.528061)
0.026077* 
(2.516368)
0.025900* 
(2.460634) 
0.026077* 
(2.452652)
Military Exp. -0.053179* 
(4.286631)
-0.052031* 
(-7.215661)
-0.053179*  
(-4.172301) 
-0.052031* 
(-7.032956)
Public revenues 0.032788* 
(4.324939)
0.032319* 
(8.585376)
0.032788* 
(4.209587) 
0.032319* 
(8.367989)
Demo-u -0.001025*
 (-3.649471)
-0.001178*
 (-7.557296)
-0.001025* 
 (-3.552134) 
-0.001178* 
(-7.365941)
Demo-r -0.000571* 
(-3.639591)
-0.000665* 
(-4.972210)
-0.000571*  
(-3.542518) 
-0.000665*
 (-4.846311)
Voter turnout -0.000532 
(-0.922096)
 -0.000532  
(-0.897502) 
Globalisation -3.13E-06 
(-0.320087)
 -3.13E-06  
(-0.311550) 
D-1940 -0.000719* 
(-7.774027)
-0.000725* 
(-9.797269)
-0.000719*  
(-7.566682) 
-0.000725*
 (-9.549197)
SS-Log GDP -0.000171 
 (-0.617843) 
-0.000235 
(-0.975683)
Health-Log 
GDP 
-0.000184 
 (-0.886090) 
-0.000247
 (-1.457497)
Welf-Log GDP -0.000444*  
(-2.401984) 
-0.000507* 
(-3.370270)
 
Adj. R-squared 0.685322 0.604656
 
0.699045 0.712783
DW 1.401258 1.389974 2.068016 2.046788
Nºobserv/usable 51/51 51/51 51/51 51/51
 
Notes: * Explanatory variables significant at 1% confidence level. ** Explanatory variables 
significant at 5% confidence level. 
The regressions for this panel were estimated by OLS corrected for heterocedasticity using 
White’s method. For the origin and composition of the variables, see the Appendix.  
 
 
In addition to the variables outlined above we also incorporated within the 
analysis a Dummy (D-1940), which takes a value of 1 for the year 1940 and 0 
for the rest of the periods. This dummy variable seeks to correct the specific fall 
in social spending following the Civil War, a drop that broke with the trend 
established in previous years. D-1940 is significant and improves the goodness 
of fit of the model notably. Its negative coefficient indicates that the impact of 
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the Civil War on the evolution in social spending as a function of GDP was 
worse than indicated by the model’s explanatory variables. In accordance with 
the estimates that appear in Table 2, we can conclude that social spending 
behaviour in Spain between 1880 and 1940 was determined to a great extent by 
economic, demographic, political and budgetary variables, as it was in other 
countries. However, the Spanish case does present a number of singularities that 
will be analysed below.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
 The results shown in Table 2 mean that the Spanish case can now be 
incorporated into the ongoing debate in the international literature concerning 
the historical determinants of the welfare state. In column (1) we include the 
explanatory variables typically used in the literature to account for the evolution 
in the percentage of social spending in Spain between 1880 and 1960, while in 
column (2) we show the results of eliminating the variables that were not 
significant in the first estimation. 
Our results show that the Growth GDP variable was highly significant in 
the two estimations and presented a positive sign, indicating that social spending 
presented a pro-cyclical behaviour during the study period. At the same time, the 
other variable representative of economic development, Log GDP, was not 
significant in the first estimation but was in the second. However, the coefficient 
associated with this variable did not present the expected positive sign a priori, a 
result that is difficult to explain. Some earlier studies suggest that income levels 
did not play such an important role as it was traditionally thought38. But this 
does not mean that the level of income might have a negative effect on the 
evolution in social spending, as estimation 2 indicates. This result could reflect 
the fact that income per capita does not have the same effect on the three 
                                                 
38 See Lindert (1994 and 2004). 
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endogenous variables – welfare, health and social security expenditure - 
included in the analysis. Specifically, it might be that the Log GDP variable has 
a negative effect on welfare spending, given that it is an item of expenditure 
with a marked traditional nature and with a tendency to diminish as a country’s 
income level rises; whereas, in the case of public spending on health and social 
security, it is possible that the effect of income level is not even significant. 
Under these circumstances, the significant and negative coefficient of Log GDP 
may simply be a consequence of the primacy of the first effect on the second. 
To test for this possibility, we opted to estimate a new equation with a 
specific GDP per capita for each type of social spending. The results are 
included in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, in which it can be seen that the 
coefficient of the Log GDP variable associated with spending in health and 
social security (Health- Log GDP and SS- Log GDP respectively) is not 
significant, while it is significant - presenting a negative sign - in the case of 
welfare expenditure (Welf- Log GDP). Therefore, we can conclude that the 
negative sign of the Log GDP variable is conditioned by the behaviour of 
welfare spending. Moreover, by considering a specific Log GDP for each 
endogenous variable we improve the goodness of fit of the model significantly, 
and the behaviour of the rest of the variables, which we discuss in detail below, 
is not affected. 
The effects derived from demographic change were significant and 
presented the expected signs. Specifically, the results show that the ageing of the 
population (Adults 65), derived largely from an improvement in welfare and a 
greater life expectancy, increased (ceteris paribus) the demand for spending for 
social purposes at the same time as it favoured greater support from society for 
policies of this type. Seen from this perspective, as the population has aged, 
governments have come under more pressure to increase social spending within 
the budget. By contrast, the relative increase in the young adult population 
stemmed the percentage growth in social spending with respect to GDP.   
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In the case of the political factors, the variables related to democracy 
(Demo-r and Demo-u) were relevant with a high degree of significance, but both 
presented a negative coefficient.39 For the Demo-r variable, which captures the 
effect on social spending of the right to vote being restricted to the social elite, 
we obtained a similar result to the one we expected. However, the introduction 
of universal suffrage, an effect captured by the Demo-u variable, should have 
had a priori a positive effect on social spending. To explain this result we need 
to bear in mind the weakness of the democratic system in Spain during the 
period of study. In the cacique democracy of the Bourbon restoration (1874-
1923), the shift from census male suffrage to universal male suffrage in 1890 
had virtually no impact on social protection programmes. In fact, during this 
period, the low turnout at the elections and the weak competition for votes 
between parties that had an almost exclusively urban base was notable.40 Suffice 
it to say that in the 1920 elections little more than 10% of the population voted, 
so that the capacity of the popular classes to bring pressure to bear when 
demanding greater social protection through their right to vote was weak. In 
fact, the percentage of voters (Voter turnout) was not significant in either of the 
estimations conducted to explain social spending behaviour with respect to GDP 
(columns 1 and 3). Moreover, in the periods of dictatorship, when the majority 
of rights and liberties were suspended (voting, unions, strike action, etc.), the 
percentage of social spending did not suffer any fall. Indeed, during the Primo 
de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930) the growing evolution in social spending 
initiated after World War I continued. Further, during the Franco dictatorship 
(1939-1975), despite the fact that there was a marked drop in spending after 
1945, the rate did not fall below the levels reached in 1930.  
In the case of the budgetary variables, both public revenues as a 
percentage of GDP and military spending were significant and presented the 
                                                 
39 An identical result to that obtained by Lindert (2004, II, p. 21) in his estimation. 
40 Linz, Montero & Ruiz (2005), p. 1037 
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expected sign. Therefore, we can conclude that the stages of economic growth in 
which the state managed to improve its revenues with respect to GDP, by 
changes in the tax system and/or by exerting greater fiscal pressure, favoured the 
increase in social spending in relative terms. The quantitative evidence 
corroborates the classic thesis of the historiography that holds to the idea that the 
scarcity of resources available to the Spanish treasury conditioned the 
modernization of the public spending structure, at least in the years between 
1880 and 1960. Moreover, the periods of greatest militarism characterised by 
relative increases in defence spending, regardless of the existence of any 
particular armed conflict, obliged governments to assign a large part of their 
scare resources to this item of expenditure, with the consequent negative effects 
for social spending.  
Finally, we introduced into our analysis the effects derived from the 
opening up of the Spanish economy (Globalisation). The variable was not 
relevant in any of the cases (columns 1 and 3). This result appears coherent if we 
bear in mind the low degree of openness shown by the Spanish economy, below 
25% during the period of study41. Within this context, the foreign sector should 
not have represented a major source of instability for the Spanish economy, nor 
a factor that contributed to increasing workers’ demands for social protection. If 
the Spanish economy remained largely on the margins of international markets 
during most of the study period, it is only logical that the coefficient of openness 
did not have any significant impact on the evolution in social spending.42   
                                                 
41 Carreras & Tafunell (2004), p. 457. The Spanish economy was more closed than the 
average European economy between 1880 and 1960. In particular, in 1880 the degree of trade 
openness in Spain was below 40% of the mean for the European Union; in 1920 it was close 
to 60%, falling again to around 40% in 1960, following the political autarky of the Franco 
dictatorship. According to these authors, the degree of openness reflects the changes in the 
country both in terms of commercial policy and exchange policy. 
42 Comín (1996, p. 71) points out that resistance to tax reforms has resulted in the intervention 
of the Spanish state in the form of excessive regulation of foreign and home markets. As there 
has not been sufficient money to solve the failures and deficiencies of the private economy 
through budgetary policy, successive governments have tried to substitute the market by 
means of laws and decrees protecting production against the external market and by seeking 
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 In short, between 1880 and 1960 the Spanish economy had yet to see the 
culmination of its process of industrialization, still presented a mean degree of 
openness well below the European average and severe democratic weaknesses 
(40% of the period being marked by dictatorial regimes). However, the 
percentage of social spending in Spain increased, although it remained below the 
European average. But, what was the contribution of each of the explanatory 
variables to the historical changes in the percentage of social spending in Spain? 
In Table 3 we calculate the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
changes in the percentage of social expenditure on welfare, health care and 
social security in Spain between 1880 and 1960. The contribution of each 
explanatory variable (the figure given in brackets) was calculated as the 
coefficient of regression 4 from Table 2 multiplied by the mean of the variable 
in each type of social expenditure and period. The results reveal that behind the 
historical advance in the percentage of social spending in Spain the demographic 
factors played a key role, accounting for around 60% of its evolution in the 
period of study. The level of per capita income, by contrast, had a very limited 
influence on the evolution in social spending, while the evolution in the 
economic cycle was highly influential. In fact, the economic cycle is capable of 
explaining around 18% of the variations in the level of social spending, which 
highlights that this factor had a markedly pro-cyclical behaviour throughout the 
period. The budgetary variables are the third main factor in explaining the 
evolution in social spending. The level of state income explains around 13% of 
the variations in social expenditure. As is only to be expected, the availability of 
state income conditioned the development of social policy markedly. Moreover, 
military spending undermined the capacity of the state to increase social 
spending by more than 5%. Finally, the political variables, specifically the 
existence of census suffrage and universal suffrage, did little to account for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
to favour certain sectors and companies. Seen from this perspective, we introduced the level 
of nominal protection of the Spanish economy as an explanatory variable but this too proved 
to be non significant. 
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evolution in social spending between 1880 and 1960. This result is hardly 
surprising in the case of Spain, given the weight of the dictatorial regimes in the 
period of study. 
 
Table 3. Effect of each variable on social spending as a percentage of GDP 
in Spain (1880-1960) 
 
 SS-GDP Health-GDP Welf-GDP 
C 0,005599 0,005599 0,005599 
Trend -3.86E-08 -3.86E-08 -3.86E-08  
Growth GDP 0,00502418,36%
0,005024
18,36%
0,005024 
18,30% 
Young Adults -0,01385650,63%
-0,013856
50,63%
-0,013856 
50,47% 
Adults 65 0,0025379,27%
0,002537
9,27%
0,002537 
9,24% 
Military 
Expend. 
-0,001535
5,61%
-0,001535
5,61%
-0,001535 
5,59% 
Public 
Revenues 
0,003694
13,50%
0,003694
13,50%
0,003694 
13,45% 
Demo-u -0,0004851,77%
-0,000485
1,77%
-0,000485 
1,77% 
Demo-r -0,0001170,43%
-0,000117
0,43%
-0,000117 
0,43% 
D-1940 -0,0000430,16%
-0,000043
0,16%
-0,000043 
0,16% 
?-Log GDP -0,0000750,27%
-0,000078
0,29%
-0,000161 
0,59% 
Predicted 0,000742100,00%
0,000739
100,00%
0,000656 
100,00% 
Real 0,000425 0,000315 0,000481 
Note: The contribution of each variable is calculated from the coefficient of the regression 
(Table 2, column 4) multiplied by the average value of each variable during the period. The 
percentages appear in brackets. The constant (C) and the trend maintain the same value as in 
the regression. The aforementioned value is the sum of the changes that each variable 
contributes. The real value is the average of the level of social spending during each period. 
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Social spending as a percentage of GDP in Spain remained relatively low 
compared to the figures recorded by other countries between 1880 and 1960. If 
this variable is taken to be representative of the progress made by the welfare 
state then we must conclude that the situation was somewhat disappointing. 
However, despite this general outlook, various changes in the internal structure 
and the percentage trend in social spending in Spain during the period of study 
can be identified. The main events in this trend were the percentage falls in 
spending during the liberal period and the immediate post-Civil War years, 
stagnation between 1890 and World War I and an upward movement during the 
1920s and the Second Republic.  
Yet, which variables determined the behaviour in social spending as a 
percentage of GDP between 1880 and 1960? To answer this question we 
constructed a panel-data set divided in five-year periods with the percentage of 
social spending disaggregated in three groups: health care, social security and 
welfare. We analysed the impact on social spending of the long-term evolution 
in economic growth and the structural changes that accompanied it, as well as 
changes in the political and budgetary variables and the effects of globalisation. 
The lessons shown by this historical analysis indicate that the percentage of 
social spending as a percentage of GDP in Spain between 1880 and 1960 was 
positively determined by the ageing of the population and the cycles in which 
economic growth was greatest, but negatively by the percentage of young adult 
population between the ages of 20 and 35. On the other hand, while per capita 
income levels did not exercise any influence on the growth in public spending in 
health care and social security, they did contribute to the reduction in welfare 
spending, an item of expenditure with a marked traditional nature. In short, we 
can conclude that demographic factors played a determining role in the initial 
stages of the development of the welfare state; while economic growth had a 
more ambiguous influence. 
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If we look at the political variables, the weak democratic structure of the 
Restoration and the weight of the dictatorial regimes during the study period 
(40%) account for the negative impact of the democratic framework on the 
percentage rate of social spending. In line with this argument, it would appear 
logical that the percentage of voters in the years in which elections were held 
was not at all significant in the estimation. By contrast, the behaviour of public 
revenues and defence spending whose growth fostered and restricted, 
respectively, the historical trend in social spending in relative terms were 
determining factors.  Finally, the degree of openness of the Spanish economy 
did not have any significant influence on social spending either, which is logical 
in a period in which the country remained somewhat closed to foreign markets. 
In short, our analysis allows us to place the Spanish case within the international 
debate on the historical determinants of welfare and the results obtained 
highlight a number of interesting features specific to the country.    
 
 
Appendix 
Globalisation: In line with Lindert’s model (2004, II, p. 72), the degree of 
openness of the Spanish economy has been defined as the sum of its exports and 
imports as a percentage of GDP, Tena (2005), table 8.8, p. 624. The GDP data 
series were taken from Prados (2003). Source: Tena, A. (2005) pp. 573-644 and 
Prados de la Escosura (2003), table A.11.2. 
D1940: Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for 1940 and 0 for the rest 
of the period. 
Demo-r: Dummy variable based on information provided by Linz, 
Montero & Ruiz (2005), electoral system for the elections to the Spanish 
Parliament, table 14.2, p. 1075 and ff. It takes a value of 1 during the period 
analysed in which male census suffrage applied (1880-1890), and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Linz, J. J., Montero, J. R. & Ruiz, A. M. (2005), pp.1027-1154. 
Demo-u: Dummy variable based on information provided by Linz, 
Montero & Ruiz (2005), electoral system for the elections to the Spanish 
Parliament, table 14.2, p. 1075 and ff. It takes a value of 1 during the period 
analysed in which universal male suffrage (1891-1923 and 1931-1932) and 
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universal suffrage (1933-1936) applied, and 0 otherwise. Source: Linz, J. J., 
Montero, J. R. & Ruiz, A. M. (2005), pp.1027-1154. 
Military expenditures: Ratio of public spending on defence (functional 
classification) to GDP. Source: Comín, F. & Díaz, D. (2005), pp. 873-964 and 
Prados de la Escosura (2003), table A.11.2. 
PSS-GDP: Public social spending as a percentage of GDP. For the 
analysis, we classified social spending in three groups: WelfGDP, HealthGDP, 
SSGDP. The date series are taken from Espuelas (2008). 
Public Revenues: Percentage of total state revenues as a percentage of 
GDP. The total income is taken from the section: “Derechos reconocidos y 
liquidados totales”, in the administrative classification of State Income drawn 
up by Comín & Díaz (2005), table 12.9, p. 912 and ff. and Prados de la Escosura 
(2003), table A.11.2. 
Log GDP: Logarithm of the level of GDP at factor cost per capita is taken 
from Prados (2003), table A.11.2. 
Growth GDP: Representative variable of the economic cycle. Mean 
annual growth in GDP per capita over the last five years, Prados (2003), table 
A.11.2 (in 000s of pesetas).  
POAGT: Active agrarian workforce as a percentage of the total active 
population, Nicolau (2005), p. 149, table 2.27.  
Adults 65: Ratio between the population over 65 years of age and the 
population over 20, Nicolau (2005), table 2.23, p. 145. 
Young Adults: Ratio between the population aged between 20 and 34 and 
the population over 20, Nicolau (2005), table 2.23, p. 145.  
PROT: Degree of protection of the Spanish economy, Tena (2005), table 
8.8, p. 624.  
Voter turnout: Percentage of the Spanish population that exercised their 
right to vote with respect to the population census, obtained from data shown by 
Linz, Montero & Ruiz (2005) on Election to the House of Representatives 
during the Restoration (1876-1923), table 14.6, p. 1093, the data on Elections to 
the Spanish Parliament during the Second Republic (1931-1936), table 14.11, p. 
1098 and Nicolau (2005) based on population censuses, table 2.23, p. 145. We 
also worked with the percentage of the Spanish population that exercised their 
right to vote with respect to the electoral register and the population over the age 
of 25 but the results were similar. 
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